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JEL Classification: F35, F22, J15 
Keywords: foreign aid, asylum seekers and refugees, development. 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
* marina.murat@unimore.it. Dipartimento di Economia ‘Marco Biagi’, Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia.  
I thank the participants to the Bari Conference, Economics of Global Interactions, 2017. I am particularly indebted to 
Elisabetta Lodigiani, Massimiliano Bratti, Fréderic Docquier, Anzelika Zaiceva and Clementina Crocé for useful 
suggestions. An earlier version of this paper is in  http://merlino.unimo.it/campusone/web_dep/wpdemb/0113.pdf. 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction. 
During the last decade, asylum applications in OECD countries increased more than fivefold– 
from 316,330 in 2006 to 1,661,500 in 2015 –, and are expected to rise in the future. This has generated 
an intense debate in rich countries about the norms on asylum permits and refugees integration, but 
also on the feasibility of influencing the inflows at their source, possibly through measures of 
economic policy. This, however, appears to be an elusive task. In the first place, because in fact there 
is just one suitable policy instrument: foreign aid. In the second place, because views about the effects 
of aid on asylum inflows differ strongly. One opinion is that aid helps countries to overcome the 
political and economic crises at the root of the flows of refugees, and hence deters them, another is 
that aid allows resource-constrained people in the recipient country to afford the costs of migration, 
and hence increases asylum applications. 
Opinions about aid and migration also differ among scholars. In particular, the economic 
literature on international migration includes some studies about the effects of aid on migration and 
a few on aid and asylum applicants, but findings are heterogeneous. One example is the collection of 
articles edited by Böhning et al. (1994), which share the common goal of uncovering the influence of 
aid on general migration, but reach differing and contrasting results (Martin, 1994). Regarding forced 
migration, in Thielemann (2004) aid has a positive influence on asylum inflows in 20 OECD countries 
during 1985-1999, while in Neumayer (2005) aid has no effect on applications in Western Europe 
during 1982-1999. 
This paper measures the impact of bilateral aid on asylum seeker applications from 113 sending 
countries in 14 OECD destination economies for each year over the period 1993-2013. In principle, 
by improving living and economic conditions in the recipient country, aid can both prevent and 
encourage refugee migration. My central hypothesis is that either effect depends on the level of 
development of the recipient country. Therefore, I test whether aid effects on asylum inflows vary 
with the level of average income of the origin economies. As a side effect, aid could also influence 
voluntary migration. Hence, I also measure this secondary potential effect. This paper adds to the 
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existent literature in three main ways: it focuses explicitly on foreign aid as a policy tool designed to 
influence forced migration; it tests its possible relation with the level of development of the recipient 
country; and it measures its overall influence, on forced and voluntary inflows.    
International norms and agreements outline the difference between refugee and voluntary 
migration. A refugee is a person who ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country’ (Refugee Convention, 1951). On the other hand, a migrant is a person 
who leaves the country for any other reason. While there is a grey area between the two types of 
migration, their different traits prevail. The refugee flees the home country to escape an extremely 
critical situation but she would rather not leave. She does not choose the destination, nor does the 
destination choose her, as it would happen in a totally voluntary setting. On the other hand, a migrant 
chooses where to move given a clearly defined set of alternatives and opportunities, including the 
destination country’s policies on immigration (Dustmann et al. 2016).  
Forced migration is as old as human history, while international aid is officially recognised as 
a transfer of resources from one country to another only since the end of the second world war. The 
majority of foreign aid takes the form of donations, while a minor proportion consists of grants. Its 
goals are clearly stated by OECD: ‘Official Development Aid (ODA) is administered with the 
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective’. 
Despite the professed aim, several studies find that a substantial part of the aid provided by rich 
economies is unrelated to the real needs of recipient countries. (Boone 1996; Alesina and Dollar 2000; 
Collier and Dollar 2002; Lancaster 2007; Fuchs et al. 2014; Jones 2015). However, among these real 
needs there can be some determinants of forced migration. Hence, if, as hypothesised above, refugee 
migration and development are related, then the transfers of aid fulfilling the goals of economic 
development and welfare can indirectly affect refugee and asylum seeker movements.   
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This study’s main findings are that the effects of bilateral aid on asylum inflows depend on the 
average income of the origin country. Specifically: aid to poor countries reduces asylum inflows, 
while transfers to medium-income developing economies can increase applications. The deterring 
effect concerns especially inflows from Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, aid generates negative cross-
donor spillovers: more aid from other countries decreases the number of asylum inflows in the OECD 
destination. A further result is that foreign aid has no effect on voluntary immigration. Hence, bilateral 
aid influences the inflows of asylum seekers without, as a side effect, affecting those of immigrants. 
Indirect effects are also discussed. I use a dynamic panel empirical model with a rich array of fixed 
effects and different specifications to control for the robustness and sensitivity of results. To 
specifically control for potential endogeneity, I use System GMM in levels and differences. The rest 
of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews and resumes the related literature, Section 3 
presents data sources and descriptive statistics, Section 4 describes the estimation strategy, Section 5 
presents and discusses results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature. 
The empirical literature finds the determinants of forced and voluntary migration to be mostly 
similar, with economic factors being more important for voluntary migration, and political factors for 
forced migration (Neumayer 2005). Regarding voluntary migration, it appears to depend especially 
on average income and income growth in origin and destination countries. Specifically, the difference 
between average income of destination and origin economies affects migration in Hatton and 
Williamson (2005), Mayda (2010), Grogger and Hanson (2011), Ortega and Peri (2013), and several 
others. A positive effect of income at destination is in Hartog and Vriend (1989), Katseli and Glystos 
(1989), Lundborg (1991), and Bauer and Zimmermann (1998). These results suggest that emigration 
decreases with development in the origin economy (per capita income negatively affects emigration 
in Ortega and Peri 2013). However, other studies find that an increase of per capita income in the 
origin country initially boosts emigration, and discourages it only beyond a certain stage of 
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development. The hypothesis of a bell-shaped function of emigration in average income is present in 
Martin and Taylor (1996), de Haas (2007) and other authors. Using cross-country data, Clemens 
(2014) provides evidence on this inverted ‘U’ relationship. He states that it could hold also in the 
long-run, but that length of time is longer than that of most panel databases. Other potential 
determinants of migration tested in empirical studies concern other economic factors – such as 
unemployment – and political and institutional characteristics of countries (among others, Hatton and 
Williamson 2005; Docquier et al. 2014). 
A potential determinant of peoples’ international movements is foreign aid. Faini and Venturini 
(1993) hypothesise that aid, as development, initially fosters emigration from poor countries, where 
would-be migrants face resource constraints, and exerts the opposite effect beyond a certain level of 
average income, in a reverse U-shaped relationship. The book Aid in Place of Migration?, edited by 
Böhning et al. (1994), contains several studies on the link aid-migration, but not a homogenous result 
(Martin, 1994). Schiff (1994), Vogler et al. (1997), and Vogler and Rotte (2000) also hypothesise a 
bell-shaped relationship between aid, development and migration. Berthélemy et al. (2009), using 
cross-country data from a wide set of countries, find that bilateral aid encourages migration from the 
poorer economies and reduces it from less poor ones. Belloc (2015), also using a cross-section of 
countries, finds a positive relationship, in this case linear, between foreign aid and total emigration 
from South Saharan countries. In Nyberg Sørensen et al. (2003), aid to poor countries has no unique 
effects on migration to rich economies. The authors test also the impact of aid transfers to 
neighbouring economies of countries in political crisis. In a press article, (Clemens and Sandefur 
2015) state that the aid-development-migration nexus is positive: more aid to poor countries boosts 
immigrant flows to rich economies.   
Regarding refugee and asylum migration to rich countries, some studies find that it diminishes 
with higher levels and growth of per capita GDP in the home country (Neumayer 2005; Hatton 2009). 
More generally, forced migration significantly depends on protest and oppression, conflict and 
genocide in the origin country (Marfleet 2006; Schmeidl 1997; Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and 
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Shellman 2007; and Hatton 2009). As seen above, among few others, Thielemann (2004) and 
Neumayer (2005) include foreign aid among the potential determinants of refugee and asylum flows, 
but reach different results. 
Other potential determinants of bilateral migration are migrant networks; they can decrease the 
costs of international movements and facilitate further inflows from the home country. In Neumayer 
(2004), the stocks of asylum seekers have a pull effect on new asylum applicants. Hatton (2016) finds 
a positive influence of immigrant stocks on asylum applications. In Davenport et al. (2003), past 
refugee migration positively influences refugee stocks. However, to my knowledge, no study tests 
the effects of all these three groups – former asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants – on asylum 
applicants. The implicit assumption is that the three blend in unique composite aggregate, defined 
only by the country of origin. In the real world, however, the three groups can remain quite distinct 
and exert independent effects. For example, voluntary migrants, refugees and asylum seekers may 
reach the host country in different periods, belong with different social classes or ethnic groups in the 
home country, or hold different political, religious or cultural orientations. This can make their 
allegiance to the origin country weaker than their fidelity to their own group, ethnicity or political 
orientation. For example, immigrants can regard asylum seekers as less akin than other immigrants, 
and vice versa. Therefore, network effects can differ between groups.1 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides standardised cross-
country data on refugees and asylum seekers since 1950, and the OECD statistics division is the main 
source of standardised data on Official Development Aid (ODA) since 1969. I built a panel database 
by using data from UNHCR extracted from OECD Statistics on the asylum applications submitted 
                                                          
1 This can apply especially, but not only, to countries of origin with strong internal divisions determined by religion or 
ethnicity. Political divisions may also matter. Some evidence suggests that refugees from Latin America who flew their 
countries during the dictatorships of the seventies of last century scarcely interact with economic migrants from their 
home countries who arrived later.  
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by people from 113 developing countries in 14 destination economies – Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
and United States –each year during 1993-2013. The first year with data from former ex-communist 
countries in Eastern Europe is 1993. Asylum seekers are individuals who have sought international 
protection, and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined (UNHCR). Asylum 
applications from the list of 113 origin countries account for almost 80 percent of all asylum 
application in the selected OECD destinations (and 70 percent of asylum applications in all Western 
OECD countries), during the period considered. Data on foreign aid, regarding the ODS (net 
disbursements) from each donor (destination country for asylum seekers) economy to each recipient 
(origin country of asylum applicants) are extracted from OECD Statistics. A complete list of variables 
and sources, and the list of countries, is in Table A1.  
Figure 1 shows that the level of asylum applications is high at the beginning of the period 
considered, partly as a consequence of the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, but decreases rapidly 
afterwards, with the consolidation of the new world order. Many refugees from the former republics 
of the Soviet Union return home, and asylum inflows into the selected OECD destinations decrease. 
Another important wave of asylum seeker inflows – still underway and expected to last for the next 
few years – started with the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 and the subsequent military conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Substantial increases of asylum applications followed also the Balkans’ ethnic 
conflicts, the ‘Arab spring’ in Middle Eastern and North African countries, and political turmoil in 
countries of Sub Saharan Africa and central Asia. During the same time-span, bilateral aid initially 
falls, grows from 2000 until 2006, and decreases again afterwards. These modifications partly 
coincide with changes of the main origin and recipient countries. Table A2 lists the twenty top origin 
countries of asylum applications and bilateral aid recipients during 1993-2000 and 2001-2013. In the 
second period, there are fewer asylum applications from Eastern Europe and more from the Middle 
East and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Figure 1 - Bilateral aid and asylum seeker inflows  
 
4. Estimation strategy 
In order to study the correlations between foreign aid and asylum applications, I use dynamic 
panel regressions. The dependent variable is the number of asylum applications each year in the 
destination country. The base regression is:  
 
lnYodt =  λlnYodt-1 + βTodt + γOot + δDdt + εodt,                                                    (1) 
where lnYodt is the (log of the) number of asylum applications of individuals from country o in country 
d during year t; lnYodt-1 is its value lagged one year; it should capture the influence of former asylum 
seekers on new inflows. Todt includes other dyadic variables. Among them is the variable of interest, 
aid provided by the OECD country d to developing country o. Aid should have positive or negative 
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effects depending on whether it provides incentives to remain or to flee the country and, in the second 
case, on how it influences individuals’ preferences across possible destinations.2 The stocks of 
Bilateral refugees and Bilateral immigrant inflows should exert distinct pull effects on asylum 
applicants. As expected, the correlation between the variables regarding asylum seekers, refugees and 
migrants is not high: Table A3 shows that correlation coefficients are below or around 0.3. Distance 
between origin and destination should capture the effective cost of international migration and of 
cultural dissimilarities between countries. Bilateral trade agreements between origin and destination 
can lower the costs of bilateral migration because of the knowledge they provide on partner countries.  
Oot concerns factors regarding origin countries. As with bilateral aid, transfers from all other 
countries (all countries other than d) can provide incentives to remain or reasons to leave. It, however, 
includes an ‘attraction for the donor’ component that ‘deviates’ asylum seekers from d. Per capita 
GDP, the main proxy for the country’s level of development, can also deter or facilitate asylum seeker 
flows: it provides more resources to flee, but also less reasons to do so. Population accounts for the 
size of the country. The degree of political terror and lack of civil liberties should both be important 
potential push factors (Hatton 2004; Neumayer 2004). Natural disasters (proxied by the number of 
deaths), can boost outflows (Naudé 2010; Neumayer 2005). The number of refugees from the origin 
country to all destinations except d should be positively correlated to applications in d. Moore and 
Shellman (2007) and Hatton and Williamson (2005) find that some countries are more prone to 
‘produce’ refugees than others. 
Ddt concerns characteristics of the destination country. Per capita GDP at destination is a proxy 
for expected earnings, and potentially a pull factor (Neumayer 2004). Population indicates the 
extension of the labour market. The unemployment rate signals the difficulty of finding a job and has 
an expected negative effect. Policies at destination concerning asylum seekers should also 
                                                          
2 More aid from a country can intensify the attractiveness of the donor among possible destinations. The presence of a 
donor in the recipient country, or projects funded by the donor, creates opportunities for contacts between the local 
population and the donor. More generally, it provides knowledge on the donor’s social norms, institutions and culture, 
which can decrease the costs of migration.  
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significantly influence the number of applications, but no standardised indicators on these policies 
are available. Hence, I use two proxies: the first is the rate of rejection of asylum demands from origin 
o in country d at year t. It is a weak proxy, since it includes pull and push elements. The second, more 
efficient, is an index built by Hatton and Moloney (2015) based on yearly changes in the tightness of 
refugee policies in the selected countries.   
The impact of aid on asylum applications can depend on how individuals react to the improved 
environment and the extra available resources. To test whether the level of development condition 
this response, subsequent specifications include the interaction between bilateral aid and per capita 
income in the origin country:   
                                             
lnYodt = λlnYodt-1 + βTodt + φ(ln Bilateral aidodt-1)*(ln pc GDP orig.t) +γOot + δDdt + αd + αο + αdo + 
αot + αdt + εodt                                                                                                                                   (2) 
 
These more complete specifications will also include origin-by-year, destination-origin and 
destination fixed effects. The former should capture all time-varying terms that are constant across 
destinations d and only vary by year and country of origin. Destination-origin dummies absorb all 
time-invariant bilateral variables that affect asylum applications. Destination fixed effects will 
account for factors of the destination country that are invariant or change very slowly along time, 
such as culture or institutions. In further regressions, destination-by-year will replace origin-by-year 
fixed effects. Finally, a still more complete specification will include both destination-time and 
origin-time fixed effects together with destination-origin and time dummies. This is a very demanding 
specification, as it absorbs all bilateral-specific factors as well as origin and destination time-varying 
factors. Measurement will therefore be entirely concentrated on within country-pair time variations. 
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Endogeneity and reverse causation can be an issue if aid and asylum seekers influence each other. Using 
a panel dataset on 18 donor and 148 recipient countries during the period 1992-2003, Czaika and Mayer (2011) 
find that asylum seekers and refugees in the destination economy positively affect bilateral aid. To account 
Table 1 - Dependent variable: bilateral asylum applications. Basic specifications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS OLS OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE MLR Model 7 
Asylum applications t-1 0.824*** 0.824*** 0.563*** 0.516*** 0.538*** 0.476*** 0.803*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) 
Bilateral aid t-1 -0.016*** -0.035 -0.158*** -0.101* -0.152*** -0.090 -0.202** 
  (0.005) (0.027) (0.054) (0.060) (0.052) (0.057) (0.094) 
(Bilateral aid t-1)*(pcGDP orig.)    0.003 0.024*** 0.018** 0.022*** 0.014* 0.029** 
    (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) 
Bilateral refugees t-1 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.006 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.054*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Bilateral immigrant flows t-1 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.051*** 0.040*** 0.099*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) 
Distance -0.166*** -0.165***         -0.164*** 
  (0.014) (0.014)         (0.024) 
pcGDP dest. 0.134*** 0.136*** -0.487* -0.603**     0.166*** 
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.279) (0.250)     (0.055) 
Population dest. 0.021** 0.021** -3.263*** -3.439***     -0.009 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.430) (0.366)     (0.022) 
pcGDP orig. -0.062*** -0.068*** -0.585***   -0.612***   -0.143*** 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.070)   (0.067)   (0.031) 
Population orig. 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.333**   0.292*   -0.0001 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.163)   (0.154)   (0.017) 
Total effect of pcGDP orig.  -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.537***   -0.568***   -0.086*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.067)   (0.064)   (0.014) 
time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-pair effect no no yes yes yes yes yes 
Origin effects no no yes yes yes yes yes 
Destination effects no no yes yes yes yes yes 
Origin*time no no no yes no yes yes 
Destination*time no no no no yes yes yes 
AR(2)             0.002 
AR(3)             0.102 
Hansen J test (P-value)              0.084 
Hansen diff. J test (P-value)             0.52 
Number of instruments             1,010 
Number of country-pair 1,185 1,184 1,185 1,088 1,172 1,172 1,183 
Observations 14,099 14,099 14,099 14,099 14,099 14,099 14,076 
R-squared 0.871 0.871 0.897 0.918 0.910 0.931   
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Corrected standard 
covariance matrix, robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Constant not reported. The sample is a panel 
comprising data from 1993 to 2013. All variables are in logs. Column (7): Sys-GMM, in levels and differences: LDV, Bilateral 
aid, refugees and immigrants are treated as potentially endogenous, all other control variables are treated as predetermined; 
instrumented for using their own lags in level and differences. AR (2) and AR (3) are second-step and third-step Arellano-Bond 
test for serial correlation. AR(1), not reported, = 0.  Total effect of pcGDP orig. is calculated by summing the coefficients on 
pcGDP orig. and on (Bilateral aid t-1)*(pcGDP orig.), evaluated at the average level of Bilateral aid.    
12 
 
for potential endogeneity, I use System GMM specifications in levels and differences based on Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and Roodman (2009a).  
 
5. Results  
5.1. Base specifications 
The base results of the estimation of equations (1)-(2) are in Table 1.  The dependent variable is the log 
of the annual applications for asylum – plus one – for each country pair. Adding one allows me to keep the 
information from the zero-flow observations3. The variables Bilateral aid, Bilateral refugees and Bilateral 
immigrants are lagged one period to allow their effects to influence asylum seekers. The variable of interest, 
Bilateral aid, should affect asylum movements from the origin (recipient), o, to destination (donor), d, country, 
but its coefficient is not signed a priori; I hypothesise that it is correlated with the average income of the origin 
country. All regressions include a time trend and year fixed effects. In the OLS-FE specifications country 
effects (column 2) and country and country*time fixed effects (columns 3-6) are controlled for. Column 7 
depicts the results of the Sys-GMM specification, which controls for endogeneity.  
The pooled OLS estimates provide a first idea of how the data are correlated without controlling for 
country fixed effects, and therefore overestimate the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable.  Across 
regressions, this coefficient spans from 0.82 in the OLS specification of column 1 to 0.52 in the OLS-FE 
specification of column 4. It is always significant at the 1 percent level, evidencing that past asylum seekers 
have a robust influence on new applications. As expected, the value of the  
coefficient in the Sys-GMM specification lies between the values of the OLS and OLS-FE coefficients 
(Roodman 2009a).   
Our variable of interest, Bilateral aid, has a negative and significant effect on asylum applications in 
column 1. Hence, more aid appears to deter bilateral asylum inflows. The possibility that this aggregate effect 
is non-linear, and correlated with per-capita income, is first tested in column 2. There, coefficients on Bilateral 
aid and on the interacted variable (Bilateral aid)*(pc GDP orig.) are not significant, but suggest that the effect 
                                                          
3 Part of foreign aid is concessional in character and conveys a grant element (OECD). As an effect of interest repayment, some 
figures are negative. However, they are a very small proportion of total observations and have been substituted by zeros. 
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of aid on asylum applications is negative for low levels of income, nil for intermediate ones and positive for 
medium-income developing countries. Subsequent regressions confirm this U-shaped relationship; 
coefficients are significant in columns 3-7, signs are in all cases negative on Bilateral aid and positive on the 
interacted variable.  
Column 4 includes origin-time, destination, country-pair and time fixed effects, which excludes all time-
varying variables concerning origin countries because of collinearity. This specification takes into account the 
potential heterogeneity between leavers and non-leavers in origin countries (Ortega and Peri 2013). In column 
5, destination-time fixed effects control for time-varying factors not captured by the variables included in the 
regression, such as, for example, asylum and refugee policies in destination countries. Column 6 reports the 
results of the more exacting specification, where all possible fixed effects are included – time, destination-
origin, destination-time and origin-time (origin and destination fixed effects are ‘absorbed’ by the destination-
origin effects) –, results concern only within country-pair variations. As in previous regressions, the 
relationship between aid and asylum seekers is non-linear: aid transfers to the poorer countries determine a 
reduction in asylum applications, but the coefficient becomes positive at higher levels of development. To 
account for the possibility of endogeneity of Bilateral aid, I use the System-GMM estimator in levels and 
differences (column 7). More specifically, Bilateral aid, Bilateral refugees, Bilateral immigrants and the 
lagged dependent variable are specified as potentially endogenous regressors. Results confirm the U-shaped 
relationship: coefficients on aid and on the interacted variable are respectively negative and positive, and 
significant at the 1 percent level. More specifically the turning point takes place at an average income of about 
3000$ at constant 2011 international US$. The reported values of tests on serial correlation and over-
identification restrictions confirm the validity of results.4  
These findings show that aid to poor countries provide individuals with incentives and resources to stay, 
while the same transfers to medium-income economies have the opposite effect. More generally, this suggests 
that aid has a stronger impact in improving living conditions in poor countries and in attracting asylum seekers 
from medium-income economies than in allowing resource-constrained individuals to move to the rich donor 
                                                          
4 The size of the panel is N= 1582 (country-pairs), T = 21 (years). Although the number of number of instruments in columns (7) 
can appear to be high, it is lower than N (Roodman, 2009b).   
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economy. If the latter influence were the strongest, then inflows from poor countries – were individuals are 
more resource-constrained – would be positive and greater than inflows from medium-income economies. 
Rather than the U-shaped pattern evidenced by this paper’s results, a bell-shaped relationship in income 
between aid and asylum applications would apply (as hypothesised, among others, by Clemens and Sandefur 
2015). More generally, this study’s results are consistent with the definition of asylum seekers and refugees 
as individuals who are forced to leave their country, but would rather not move (Dustmann et al. 2016). 
Especially in poor countries, foreign aid can represent the critical support that allows people to remain, or to 
move temporarily to a nearby country. Aid to refugee camps is one example. At the other extreme, aid to 
medium-income developing countries may have a less crucial impact on living conditions but, by increasing 
the knowledge on the donor economy, can attract asylum seekers. This transmission of knowledge is likely to 
be more effective as asylum applicants originate from less poor economies, are endowed with higher levels of 
human capital, and face lower costs of integration at destination.      
More specifically, what are the effects of bilateral aid at different levels of development of the country 
of origin? Consequently, what are the magnitudes of transfers needed to influence the inflows from different 
origin countries? To compute the total effect of bilateral aid at different level of per capita income, I use the 
coefficients of the preferred specification, of column 7. In it, an increase of 10 percent in bilateral aid to poor 
countries, such as Burundi, Eritrea, Liberia, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African 
Republic or Afghanistan, reduces the number of applications by about 0.06 percent, with significance at the 5 
percent level. The same increase in bilateral aid to medium income developing economies, such as Turkey, 
Libya, Chile, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or United Arab Emirates, rises the number of inflows by about 0.05 
percent. In countries with intermediate levels of average income, bilateral aid has no effect. It follows that an 
increase of 10 percent of bilateral aid to, for example, Eritrea, corresponding to extra $914,200 (average 
bilateral aid to the country is $9.142 million, after the increase is $10.06 million) leads to 23 fewer applications 
(the average number of applications from Eritrea is 376.4, multiplied by the above coefficient of – 0.06, gives 
– 23). Hence, the ‘cost’, in terms of aid transfers, of reducing applications from Eritrea by one unit is $39,748. 
Similar calculations applied to Afghanistan – a stronger aid recipient but also a wider source of asylum seekers 
– show that a 10 percent increase in bilateral aid to the country, corresponding to $14.47 million of extra 
15 
 
transfers, determines a decrease of 77 applications. Hence, the ‘cost’ of each non-application from Afghanistan 
is $187,922. The same calculations apply when aid has a positive effect. However, many higher income 
developing countries, such as Chile, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or United Arab Emirates, are typically less 
dependent on foreign aid than lower income ones. 
Further findings are that both refugees and immigrant networks exert a pull effect on asylum seeker 
inflows. Coefficients on immigrants are always significant, while those on refugees are significant only in 
columns 1, 2 and 7. Moreover, once endogeneity is controlled for, immigrant networks exert a stronger pull 
effect on asylum applicants than refugees (column 7). This can be explained by immigrants having a deeper 
integration in the destination country than refugees, and hence a higher capability to provide concrete support 
to asylum seekers. The positive effect also shows that, on average, immigrants consider asylum seekers from 
their home countries as their kind and are willing to accept them in their communities. Distance, as expected, 
has a negative and significant impact: a 1 percent increase in distance leads to 0.16 percent fewer applications 
(column 7). This is consistent with empirical evidence showing that the great majority of world refugees move 
to nearby countries, with only a minor proportion of them migrating to the more distant OECD destination.5 
None of the origin countries in the sample is in the same region of, or shares a border with, the selected 
Western economies.  
Asylum applications in rich countries decrease as origin countries develop; this result is robust to the 
different specifications of Table 1. The coefficient on pcGDP orig. is negative and significant in the pooled 
OLS specification of column 1; in columns 2-7, the Total effect of pcGDP orig. is also negative and significant. 
It is calculated as the sum of the coefficient on pcGDP orig. and on the interacted term (Bilateral aid)*(pc 
GDP orig.) evaluated at the average value of Bilateral aid. This supports similar previous findings in Hatton 
(2009) and Neumayer (2005). It also shows that a positive influence of aid on development would indirectly 
deter asylum inflows.6 Again, this does not provide support to the hypothesis that aid transfers to developing 
                                                          
5 Hatton (2009, p.187) reports that ‘[o]nly a small proportion of those who are displaced become asylum seekers in Western countries 
and fewer still are accepted as genuine refugees. The applications to industrialised countries are on average less than 5 percent of 
the refugee stock [during 1970-2005]. Most of those who are counted as refugees by the UNHCR are displaced into neighbouring 
countries and often into the poverty and squalor of refugee camps near the border.’  
6 Despite the OECD states that ODA ‘is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as its main objective’, the empirical literature does not find a clear and robust effect of aid transfers on development. 
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countries, directly and indirectly, boost asylum inflows (Clemens and Sandefur 2105). The coefficient on 
Population orig. is positive and significant in columns 1-6. Regarding the destination economy, average 
income, a proxy for the expected wage, has a positive and significant effect on asylum applications in column 
7; it will considered more thoroughly in Table 2a.   
 
5.2. Robustness and sensitivity. 
Table 2a shows the results of testing the effect of other cofactors on asylum applications.  Column 1 
includes variables concerning characteristics of the destination country; column 2 includes variables on 
characteristics of the origin economy; column 6 is the most complete specification. As expected, the 
coefficients on the rate of unemployment in the destination country are negative and significant (columns 1 
and 6). If unemployment at destination increases by 1 percentage point, asylum applications diminish by 2.1 
percent, with significance at 1 percent (column 6). This result supports previous findings (Thielemann 2004).  
The effect of per capita GDP at destination on asylum applications is not robust across the different 
specifications. It is positive and significant in columns 2-5, but not in column 1 or in the more complete model 
of column 6. A similar finding is in Hatton (2016) and other studies on refugees and asylum seekers. Combined 
with the more robust result on unemployment, it suggests that asylum seekers value the prospect of finding a 
job more than the level of expected wages.  
Also as expected, the political conditions and the level of civil liberties in the origin country strongly 
and positively influence individuals’ decisions to move to the OECD destination. A 1 percent increase in 
political terror leads to an increase in applications of about 0.3 percent, while a decrease of 1 percent of civil 
liberties determines an increase in asylum inflows of 0.09 percent (columns 2 and 6). These results provide 
support to Hatton (2015). In Moore and Shellman (2007), higher levels of dissident violence and government 
terror increase the number of refugees relative to the number of internally displaced. The tendency of the 
origin country to be prone to ‘produce’ refugees, Refugees to other countries, has a small but positive influence 
on the applications in the OECD destination (column 6). On the other hand, natural disasters have no influence 
on the number of asylum seekers. This can suggest that people see natural disasters as transitory phenomena 
they can overcome without moving to a faraway destination. A similar result is in Moore and Shellman (2007)  
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Table 2a - Dependent variable: bilateral asylum applications. Robustness. Sys-GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Asylum applications t-1 0.801*** 0.788*** 0.802*** 0.809*** 0.803*** 0.786*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) 
Bilateral aid t-1 -0.182* -0.221** -0.178*   -0.205** -0.175* 
  (0.095) (0.092) (0.096)   (0.094) (0.096) 
(Bilateral aid t-1)*(pcGDP orig.)  0.028** 0.031** 0.027**   0.029** 0.028** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)   (0.013) (0.013) 
(Total aidt-1 )*(pcGDP orig.)        0.019***     
        (0.003)     
Bilateral refugees t-1 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.056*** 0.040*** 0.054*** 0.034*** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.013) 
Bilateral immigrant flows t-1 0.097*** 0.106*** 0.101*** 0.088*** 0.099*** 0.106*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.005) (0.024) (0.023) 
Distance -0.179*** -0.166*** -0.167*** -0.184*** -0.166*** -0.180*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.006) (0.025) (0.026) 
pcGDP dest. -0.019 0.211*** 0.140** 0.170*** 0.167*** -0.025 
  (0.065) (0.058) (0.059) (0.011) (0.055) (0.070) 
Population dest. -0.006 0.005 -0.019 0.010** -0.009 0.003 
  (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.004) (0.022) (0.025) 
Unemploy. rate -0.017***         -0.021*** 
  (0.004)         (0.004) 
pcGDP orig. -0.138*** -0.128*** -0.152*** -0.203*** -0.143*** -0.130*** 
  (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030) 
Population orig. 0.002 -0.033* 0.012 0.020*** 0.000 -0.022 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.004) (0.017) (0.018) 
Refugees other destinations   0.007       0.014** 
    (0.006)       (0.006) 
Political terror   0.305***       0.299*** 
    (0.040)       (0.040) 
Civil liberties   0.090**       0.085** 
    (0.035)       (0.035) 
Natural disasters   0.004       0.004 
    (0.005)       (0.005) 
Aid from all others      -0.042***     -0.042*** 
      (0.015)     (0.015) 
Total aid t-1        -0.158***     
        (0.024)     
Bilateral trade agreements         -0.019 0.025 
          (0.040) (0.041) 
Time dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-pair effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Origin effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Destination effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
AR(2) 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 
AR(3) 0.107 0.121 0.104 0.102 0.1 0.131 
Hansen J test (P-value)  0.086 0.084 0.089 0.111 0.088 0.097 
Hansen diff. J test (P-value) 0.478 0.541 0.603 0.999 0.471 0.53 
Number of instruments  1,011 1,014 1,011 990 1,010 1,017 
Number of country-pair 1,183 1,181 1,183 1,185 1,183 1,181 
Observations 14,076 14,055 14,076 14,099 14,076 14,055 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Corrected standard covariance 
matrix, robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The sample is a panel comprising data from 1993 to 2013. All 
variables are in logs except Unemploy. rate. Sys-GMM, in levels and differences: LDV, Bilateral aid, refugees and immigrants are treated as 
potentially endogenous, all other control variables are treated as predetermined; instrumented for using their own lags in level and 
differences. AR (2) and AR (3) are second-step and third-step Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. AR(1), not reported, = 0.   
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and Clemens (2014). Neumayer (2005) finds that natural disasters and famine generate internal or cross border 
migration, rather than flight to distant destinations. 
What is the influence of aid provided by all other countries on the applications to the Western 
destination, d? The regressor Aid from all others includes all donors except d. Columns 3 and 6 show that it 
generates negative and significant cross-donor spillovers: aid transfers from all other countries to o reduces 
applications from o in d. This can be partly due to aid making living conditions more bearable in the origin 
country, and partly to its attraction-for-the-donor effect, which, in this case, ‘deviates’ asylum seekers from d  
to other donors7. A similar question concerns the effect of aggregate aid – from all donors including d – on 
the applications from country o to d. Differently from Bilateral aid, the variable Total aid varies only across 
countries of origin. The positive coefficient on Total aid, lagged one year, and the negative one on the 
interacted term (Total aidt-1)*(pcGDP orig.), both significant at the 1 percent level, confirm and reinforce the 
above results: aid deters asylum seeker inflows from the poorer countries and pulls applicants from medium-
income developing economies (column 4).  
Bilateral trade agreements between countries improve the reciprocal knowledge on the partner’s 
institutions and social costumes and norms, potentially decreasing the costs of migration. Hence, a reasonable 
expectation is that Bilateral trade agreements has a positive influence on asylum applications. However, the 
coefficient on the variable is not significant, neither in column 5 nor in 6. 
Table 2b presents the results of further tests of robustness and sensitivity. As in Table 2a, all 
specifications are Sys-GMM in levels and differences, except for column 8, where I use the PPML estimator. 
A potential issue concerns the possibility of sample heterogeneity and structural break. Figure 1 and Table A2 
show that the patterns and geographical composition of asylum seeker flows and bilateral aid change after 
year 2000: asylum applications start to decline while aid transfers continue increasing. The tightening of 
several Western countries’ policies on immigration that followed the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
                                                          
7 A world economy where countries minimize the expenditure in aid for given levels of social welfare functions and negative aid 
spillovers can be characterised by multiple equilibria. Given other countries’ transfers to a specific destination, a donor can choose 
to reduce its own attraction effect by reducing its aid transfers and benefit from the attraction to the other donors. However, a 
generalised move of this kind would produce inferior equilibria: it would worsen living conditions in poor countries and lead to 
higher aggregate asylum inflows (Table 1). Jones (2015) finds evidence of positive bandwagon effects, especially among larger 
donors.   
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might partially explain the temporary decline in asylum inflows, but other factors could also be at work. Hence, 
Bilateral aid is split into two periods: first, it is multiplied by a dummy with value 1 in years 1993-2002 and 
zero otherwise and second, by a dummy with value 1 in years 2003-2013 and zero otherwise (column 1, Table 
2b). Results show that in both periods the coefficients on bilateral aid and on the interacted variable are similar 
to the aggregate result; moreover, the difference between them is not statistically significant. Hence, the 
hypothesis of homogeneity and absence of structural break cannot be rejected. 
The empirical literature finds that destination countries’ policies and norms on the recognition of the 
status of refugee affect the flows of asylum seekers. A first, imperfect proxy for such policies is the proportion 
of rejected applications from country o in country d. UNHCR provides data on the rates of rejection only from 
year 2000. Results show that the variable Proportion of rejections has no significant effect on asylum seekers 
(column 2). The variable equals one minus the recognition rates used by Neumayer (2004), who, instead, finds 
a very small but positive effect of recognition rates on the inflows of asylum seekers to Western European 
countries during the period 1982-1999. A more precise indicator of countries’ policies on refugees is the 
Asylum Policy Index built by Hatton and Moloney (2015). It concerns 48 origin countries and 19 destinations 
– including the selected 14 OECD countries of this study – during 1997-2012; it varies between destinations 
and is constant across origins. Its values range between – 4 and 11, with higher numbers indicating more 
restrictive policies. I rescaled the index to strictly positive values and transformed numbers in logs. Column 3 
of Table 2b shows the effects of destination countries’ policies on asylum applications. The coefficient on the 
Asylum Policy Index has the expected sign and is significant at the 1 percent level: a 10 percent increase in the 
index reduces asylum applications by about 1.1 percent. In Hatton and Moloney (2015), policies have stronger 
effects, but their dataset comprises only origin countries with more than 300 asylum applicants, while this 
study’s more extended database includes also countries with zero applicants.  
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Table 2b - Dependent variable: bilateral asylum applications. Robustness. Sys-GMM, PPML 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Time periods Rejected Policy Index Humanit. aid High P. terror PPML 
Asylum applications t-1 0.780*** 0.803*** 0.779*** 0.706*** 0.732*** 0.664*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.019) (0.016) 
Bilateral aidt-1   -0.229*** -0.196**   -0.209** -0.186* 
    (0.089) (0.095)   (0.102) (0.102) 
(Bilateral aidt-1)*(pcGDP orig.)   0.035*** 0.030**   0.029** 0.061** 
    (0.012) (0.013)   (0.014) (0.031) 
Aidt-1 all others -0.018 -0.026* -0.036** 0.072*** -0.009   
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.017)   
Bilateral refugees t-1 0.030** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.094*** 0.064*** -0.044** 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) 
Bilateral immigrant flows t-1 0.091*** 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.006 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.029) (0.028) 
Distance -0.184*** -0.186*** -0.196*** -0.256*** -0.249***   
  (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.041) (0.029)   
pcGDP dest. -0.074 0.096 -0.028 0.006 -0.009 1.278** 
  (0.088) (0.070) (0.072) (0.086) (0.091) (0.581) 
Population dest. 0.030 0.007 0.002 0.010 0.034 -6.854*** 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.032) (0.031) (2.018) 
Unemployment rate  -0.030*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.022***   
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)   
pcGDP orig. -0.095*** -0.149*** -0.137*** -0.063*** -0.136*** 0.073 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.022) (0.036) (0.145) 
Population orig. -0.034* -0.026* -0.020 -0.014 0.006 1.208 
  (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.020) (0.802) 
Refugees to other countries 0.004 0.004 0.014** 0.014 0.005   
  (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009)   
Political terror 0.570*** 0.209*** 0.315*** 0.385*** 0.622***   
  (0.118) (0.043) (0.040) (0.057) (0.062)   
Civil liberties 0.267** 0.094*** 0.079** 0.079 0.168***   
  (0.135) (0.034) (0.035) (0.050) (0.054)   
Bilateral aidt-1 93-02 -0.286**           
  (0.111)           
Bilateral aidt-1 03-13 -0.150**           
  (0.061)           
(Bilateral aid 93-02)*(pcGDP orig.) 0.043***           
  (0.016)           
(Bilateral aid 03-12)*(pcGDP orig.) 0.022**           
  (0.009)           
Prop. Rejected applications   0.064         
    (0.068)         
Asylum Policy Index     -0.114***       
      (0.021)       
Bilateral humanitarian aid       -0.058**     
        (0.030)     
Time dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Country-pair effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Origin effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  no 
Destination effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  no 
Ar (2) 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.015 0.294   
AR (3) 0.135 0.291 0.168 0.765 0.705   
Hansen J-test (P value) 0.165 0.054 0.075 0.371 0.296   
Hansen diff. J-test (P value) 0.847 0.307 0.33 0.704 0.924   
Number of instruments 1,033 939 985 864 1,015   
Number of country-pair 1,183 1,173 1,181 1,016 1,084 1,152 
Observations 14,078 11,473 13,886 7,528 9,481 13,977 
R-squared           0.788 
Sample  Full  2000-2013 1997-2012 Full  Pol. t.> av. Full 
Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Corrected standard covariance matrix, robust 
to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The sample is a panel comprising data from 1993 to 2013. All variables are in logs 
except Unemploy. rate. Sys-GMM, in levels and differences: LDV, Bilateral aid, refugees and immigrants are treated as potentially endogenous, 
all other control variables are treated as predetermined; variables instrumented for using their own lags in level and differences. AR (2) and AR 
(3) are second-step and third-step Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. AR(1), not reported, = 0.  Column (7): countries of origin with above 
average Political terror. 
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Up to now the variable of interest, Bilateral aid, concerned the totality of aid transfers (including 
development, education, trade, infrastructure, other purposes, and humanitarian aid). The underlying 
hypothesis was that all aid improving living conditions in the recipient country could influence the choices –
of staying or leaving, and of destination – of potential refugees. However, it can be thought that people in 
critical and extreme situations may be more directly influenced by humanitarian aid, which is specifically 
conceived for these events, than by broad donations. Hence, a variable reporting data on Humanitarian 
bilateral aid from d to o replaces Bilateral aid, and its effect on asylum seekers is tested. Data on humanitarian 
aid are extracted from the same OECD dataset on foreign aid that provides the data on Official Development 
Assistance used above, but results are not strictly comparable to previous ones because observations are about 
50 percent of those on Bilateral aid. Moreover, the geographical distributions of the two types of aid recipients 
differ: humanitarian aid is more concentrated in poor and politically dangerous countries. The coefficient on 
Humanitarian bilateral aid is - 0.06, significant at the 5 percent level (column 4, Table 2b).8 To control 
whether humanitarian aid is also related to the average income of the origin country, I also tested the effect of 
the interacted variable, (Humanitarian bilateral aid)*(pcGDP orig.), but coefficients, not shown to save space, 
on the main term and on the interaction are both not significant. Hence, humanitarian aid has a deterring effect 
on asylum seeker applications that is invariant in the origin countries’ average incomes.  
My central hypothesis, that the level of development of the origin country can influence the effects of 
aid on asylum applications, finds support in the data. However, in principle, other characteristics of countries 
could also influence the effects of aid. To test this possibility, I use the base specification of Table 1 and 
interact Bilateral aid with two variables that have a robust influence on asylum applications, and in principle 
could influence aid effects, they are Distance and Political terror. In the first case, the effect of aid on asylum 
inflows can be expected to be stronger for nearer countries, with lower costs of immigration; in the second, 
aid could deter asylum inflows more effectively where levels of political terror are not too high. Conditions 
                                                          
8 Nyberg Sørensen et al. (2003) state that ‘aid selectivity tends to allocate development aid to the well performing countries and 
humanitarian assistance to the crisis countries and trouble spots. However, development aid is more effective than humanitarian 
assistance in preventing violent conflicts, promoting reconciliation and democratization, and encouraging poverty-reducing 
development investments by migrant diasporas.’ pg.6.   
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of high political disruption might weaken the effects of aid transfers. However, results show that, in both 
cases, coefficients on the interacted variables are not significant. Hence, distance between origin and 
destination or the level of political terror do not influence the effect of aid in asylum inflows. Subsequently, I 
tested the interactions between Bilateral aid and the other regressors; also in these cases, coefficients on the 
interacted variables are not significant. Results, not shown to save space, are available upon request 
It has been hypothesised that some applicants could be ‘bogus’ asylum seekers (Neumayer, 2005). For 
example, some irregular immigrants who know that they do not fulfil the conditions to obtain the refugee 
status might apply just to avoid deportation, at least for the time needed for the application to be processed. 
To control for this possibility, I restrict the sample to countries of origin with above average levels of political 
terror. Presumably, they are more likely to generate flows of ‘genuine’ asylum applicants. Column 7 shows 
that all coefficients, including those on Bilateral aid and the interacted term, are similar to those of previous 
regressions, except for the coefficients on Political terror and Civil liberties, which, as could be expected, are 
significantly higher. 
A further potential issue relates to zeros in the dependent variable. They about 22 percent of the total 
observations, which is not a proportion that should lead to biases in coefficients.9 However, to check for this 
possibility, I use the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method of estimation, proposed by Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2010). With it, the dependent variable can be used in levels rather than in logs and zero 
values of applications can be included as they are. Column 8 reports the PPML coefficients on bilateral aid, 
the interacted variable, and other cofactors. Results remain very similar to those of previous specifications.  
A possible further check might consist in substituting zeros for the missing observations of the 
dependent variable, and running the regressions on the augmented dataset. Missing values in asylum 
applications are about 18 percent of total observations. The substitution would be justified only if there were 
good reasons to presume that missing observations coincide with very low numbers of asylum applicants. 
                                                          
9  There is only one country-pair in one year (in 33,222) with zeros for both asylum seekers and bilateral aid (Denmark-Comoros). 
The proportion of zeros in the variable of interest, bilateral aid, is 4.5 percent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
However, a check on the countries’ sources of data shows that this is not the case. Each country’s statistics 
depend on specific practices and methods of data collection, rather than on the magnitude of the flows. For 
example, OECD Population Statistics includes figures from Canada only from year 1996, but Canadian 
sources of data show that substantial numbers of asylum seekers and refugees were present in the country 
before that time. As similar evidence is available for other destinations, I do not perform the substitution. 
 
5.4 Aid and immigration.  
Does bilateral aid affect voluntary migrant inflows? This question matters because aid transfers meant 
to influence only asylum inflows might have unintended effects on immigrants. For example, aid to poor 
countries might deter asylum seekers but boost voluntary immigration. Hence, testing the effects of aid on 
voluntary migration is useful to uncover the overall effects of aid on immigration – forced and voluntary –.  
Table 3 depicts the results of substituting Immigrant inflows in country d from country o for Asylum 
applications; regressors are the same of Tables 1-2a,b It shows that, overall, Bilateral aid has no effect on 
immigrants: coefficients on the variable are positive in column 1, negative in column 5 and not significant in 
the other regressions. Column 1 depicts the coefficients of the OLS regression with time trend and time effects. 
In column 2, the OLS specification includes country and country-pair effects. Columns 3-6 are based on 
System GMM tests in levels and differences, where Bilateral aid, Bilateral refugees and the lagged dependent 
variable are potentially endogenous and the other variables are predetermined. Column 4 tests whether the 
effect of Bilateral aid on immigrants depends on the average income of the origin country. Results are that 
the coefficients on the interacted term and on Bilateral aid are not significant. Hence, there is not a unique 
and robust link between aid and voluntary migration; this supports the results of previous research (Böhning 
et al., 1994).  
A related question concerns the potential indirect effects of aid on migration, particularly through 
development in the origin country. The influence of average income in the origin country on migration to the 
destination economy is positive and significant in the pooled OLS specification (column 1), but not in columns 
2-4 (Table 3). However, as already seen, the relation could be non-linear. As already seen, some authors 
hypothesise a bell-shaped relationship between emigration and development (among others, Faini and 
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Venturini 1993; de Haas 2010, 2011; Clemens 2014). To test whether the effect of income on migration to the 
rich destination is non-linear, Columns 5 and 6 include the squared term of pcGDP orig. In the base 
specification, the coefficients on pcGDP orig. and on the squared term have the ‘right’ signs but are not 
significant (while the coefficient concerning the direct effect of aid on immigration is negative and significant 
at the 10 percent level). The two coefficients, on income and the squared term, are significant only in the 
presence of other cofactors, in column 6. Therefore, results suggesting a bell-shaped relationship between 
migration and development are not robust to different specifications. The results of Table 3 show that aid has 
no direct effect on asylum applications, and that its potential indirect effects through development remain 
highly uncertain. More generally, this study finds that aid affects the inflows of asylum seekers, but not those 
of immigrants.  
Other results are that, differently than expected, the average income of the destination country does not have 
a robust positive and significant effect on immigration. The coefficient is strongly positive and highly 
significant in column 2, which includes time, country-pair and countries effects (except for the lagged 
dependent variable, a similar specification is in Ortega and Peri 2013). However, when the Sys-GMM controls 
for endogeneity, the coefficient becomes negative, in columns 4-5, and negative and significant in column 6. 
These results do not give support to the thesis that migration is strongly driven by differences between the 
average incomes of origin and destination country (Hatton and Williamson 2005; Mayda 2010; Ortega and 
Peri 2013). On the other hand, the dimension of the country, proxied by Population dest., represents a robust 
pull factor (columns 1-6), while higher levels of unemployment exert the opposite effect (column 6). Overall, 
migrants appear to prefer bigger countries of destination with lower rates of unemployment. Furthermore, 
factors typically used in studies on asylum migration, such as Political terror and Civil liberties, affect also 
migrants. The coefficient on Political terror is positive and significant at the 1 percent, albeit its effect is less 
than half than that on asylum seekers in Tables 2a and 2b, while lower levels of Civil liberties, which are a 
strong push factor for asylum seekers, appear to deter voluntary migration to the OECD destination (column 
6).  
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Table 3 - Dependent variable: Immigrants. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS OLS-FE Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM 
              
Bilateral immigrant flows t-1 0.936*** 0.654*** 0.897*** 0.828*** 0.822*** 0.801*** 
  (0.004) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) 
Bilateral aid t-1 0.007*** 0.001 -0.009 -0.055 -0.012* 0.007 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.062) (0.007) (0.007) 
(Bilateral aid t-1)*(pcGDP orig.)        0.009     
        (0.008)     
Bilateral refugees t-1 0.009*** 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.041*** 0.022** 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Distance -0.044***   -0.070*** -0.121*** -0.103*** -0.138*** 
  (0.007)   (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) 
pcGDP dest. -0.080*** 1.167*** 0.009 -0.064 -0.064 -0.236*** 
  (0.022) (0.196) (0.043) (0.049) (0.051) (0.061) 
Population dest. 0.059*** 0.507* 0.098*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.175*** 
  (0.005) (0.294) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) 
Unemployment dest.           -0.016*** 
            (0.003) 
pcGDP orig. 0.022*** 0.007 0.020 0.011 0.155 0.918*** 
  (0.004) (0.041) (0.014) (0.025) (0.163) (0.237) 
(pcGDP orig.)2         -0.006 -0.060*** 
          (0.011) (0.016) 
Population orig. 0.043*** 0.093 0.070*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.125*** 
  (0.004) (0.108) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) 
Refugees to other countries           -0.010 
            (0.008) 
Political terror           0.122*** 
            (0.029) 
Civil liberties           -0.099*** 
            (0.030) 
Bilateral trade agreements           0.027 
            (0.026) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country-pair effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
Origin effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
Destination effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
Ar (2)     0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
AR (3)     0.24 0.235 0.241 0.218 
Hansen J-test (P value)     0.084 0.143 0.56 0.368 
Hansen diff. J-test (P value)     0.981 0.905 0.999 0.957 
Number of instruments     1,029 1,029 1,150 1,154 
Number of country_pair 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,196 1,198 1,195 
Observations 14,951 14,951 14,951 14,929 14,951 14,925 
R-squared 0.955 0.9611         
Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Corrected standard covariance 
matrix, robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The sample is a panel comprising data from 1993 to 2013. 
All variables are in logs except Unemploy. rate. Sys_GMM, in levels and differences: LDV, Bilateral aid and refugees are treated 
as potentially endogenous, all other control variables are treated as predetermined; variables instrumented for using their own lags 
in level and differences. AR (2) and AR (3) are second-step and third-step Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation. AR(1), not 
reported, = 0.   
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6.  Summary and conclusions, 
The main question of this study was whether aid transfers to developing countries influences the inflows 
of asylum seekers to rich economies. To this purpose, I measured the impact of bilateral aid to 113 developing 
countries from 14 OECD donors on asylum seeker inflows during 1993-2013. Using this comprehensive 
dataset, I found that aid deters asylum inflows from poor countries, but can attract applicants from medium-
income developing economies. Most of the deterring effects concern inflows from Sub-Saharan Africa; this 
is consistent with empirical data showing that most movements of refugee people in Sub-Saharan Africa 
remain within the region (Lucas 2006; UNHCR).  
More generally, this paper’s findings suggest that aid transfers to poor countries can improve living 
conditions to the extent that some potential leavers choose instead to stay in the home country and endure the 
difficult situation there or to move – perhaps temporarily – to a nearby location. The same aid transfers can 
have a lower impact on the living conditions of medium-income developing economies, but appear to attract 
potential leavers to the donor country. Several studies find that foreign aid is often unrelated to the real needs 
of recipient economies; this study show that aid transfers aiming at influencing asylum inflows should target 
poor countries, which presumably are also those with greater needs. Consistently, transfers of humanitarian 
aid, which concern fewer countries – those more politically unstable and subject to natural disasters –, have a 
negative and linear effect on bilateral asylum seeker inflows.  
Moreover, development in the origin country tends to reduce the flows of asylum seekers into the rich 
countries. This result, robust to all specifications, is of particular interest because it shows that aid transfers 
that boost economic development in the home countries weaken the inflows of applicants. In this case, the 
negative effect of aid on asylum inflows would be independent of the initial stage of development of the 
recipient country. OECD states that the main goal of ODA transfers is development of the recipient economy; 
this study shows that, through development, aid influences asylum and refugee inflows.   
A question related to the feasibility of using aid as a policy instrument concerns its potential side effects 
on voluntary migration. Could aid to poor countries deter asylum inflows and at the same time attract economic 
migrants? I find that foreign aid has no effect on immigration; the result is robust to all specifications. Hence, 
aid provided with the goal of influencing asylum inflows will affect just these inflows, and not those of 
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immigrants. A second issue concerns the effects of development on immigration to the OECD economy. In 
this paper’s results, higher average income in the origin country has no robust effects on immigration. Hence, 
aid that promotes development has an uncertain or no influence on immigration. Overall, aid as a policy tool 
would affect asylum but not immigrant inflows.  
Other findings of this study are that aid has negative cross-donor spillovers: more aid from other donors 
reduces the number of asylum applications in the OECD destination. This implies that a potential donor can 
find free riding convenient. Also, as in previous studies, political terror and lack of civil liberties in the origin 
country have strong and robust push effects on asylum flows. Hence, concerted aid transfers made conditional 
on improvements in the economic and political institutions of the developing country will have stronger 
overall effects on asylum inflows than uncoordinated and unconditional ones. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table A1 - Data definitions and sources. List of countries. 
Variable Definition  Source 
Asylum seekers Log of inflows of asylum seekers by nationality 
(from o to d), annual submissions.  
OECD Population Statistics, and UNHCR 
statistics 
Aid Log of Official Development Assistance 
commitments (in 2013 US $) 
OECD, International Development Statistics 
Humanitarian aid Log of Humanitarian assistance (in 2013 US $) OECD, International Development Statistics 
Refugee stocks Log of number of refugees from origin to 
destination country each year 
UNHCR Statistics 
Immigrant flows  Log of immigrant flows from origin to 
destination, each year.  
OECD, Bilateral Migration Statistics. 
Distance  Log of weighted distance, in thousand km, 
between origin and destination 
CEPII 
www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.pdf 
Proportion rejected Share of rejected asylum applications on total 
applications in country d from country o at time 
t. 
UNHCR Statistics 
Asylum Policy Index Log of composite index of policies concerning 
refugee status recognition. Varies between 1 and 
16, with higher numbers indicating more 
restrictive policies 
Hatton Moloney (2016) 
Population orig. / dest. Log of number of people in country o, d. World Bank - World Development Indicators 
pc GDP orig. / dest. Log of per capita Gross Domestic Product in 
country o, d. Constant 2005 US$. 
World Bank - World Development Indicators 
Political terror  Scale from 1 to 5. Higher numbers indicate 
higher levels of political terror.  
The Political Terror Scale. 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ 
Civil liberties  Rating from 1 to 7:  1 represents the highest and 
7 the lowest degree of civil liberties.  
Freedom House. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-
freedom-world-2017 
Natural Disasters  Number of deaths. EM-DAT. The International Disaster 
Database. http://www.emdat.be/database 
Unemployment rate 
destination 
 
Unemployment rate in destination country International Labour Statistics. 
Bilateral Trade 
agreements 
Bilateral preferential trade agreements, average 
of WTO-plus. Varies between 0 (no agreements) 
full range of agreements. 
  
World Trade Organization. Preferential Trade 
Agreements. 
Origin countries. Europe: Albania,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Belarus, Moldova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine; North Africa: Libya, Morocco, 
Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia; South of Sahara: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Rep., Congo Cape Verde, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Chad, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria; South and Central Asia: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Georgia, India, 
Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan; Middle East: United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Kuwait; Far East Asia: China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Papua 
New Guinea; South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador; North and Central America: Cuba, Dominica,  
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti,  Jamaica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago. Destination countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, Denmark Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden United States.  
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Table A2 - Bilateral aid and asylum seekers: top 20 origin countries:  
1993-2000   2001-2013 
Bilateral aid recipient    Origin of asylum seekers   Bilateral aid recipient    
Origin of asylum 
seekers 
Egypt 152.63   Serbia 3906   Iraq 355.14   Serbia 1597 
China 83.77   El Salvador 2517   Afghanistan 219.58   Iraq 1495 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 65.73   Turkey 2208   Nigeria 134.65   China 1385 
Mozambique  61.66   Iraq 1977   Congo, D.R. 130.78   Afghanistan 1253 
Tanzania 57.70   
Bosnia - 
Herzegovina 1548   Ethiopia 95.28   Somalia 939 
Indonesia 55.98   Guatemala 1490   Tanzania 87.89   Turkey 836 
Côte d'Ivoire  54.51   Afghanistan 1363   Mozambique  81.45   Iran 743 
Bangladesh  53.78   China 1273   Sudan 80.82   Pakistan 694 
Papua New Guinea  50.93   Sri Lanka 1200   Pakistan 79.31   Nigeria 600 
India 44.74   Somalia 1076   Kenia 63.82   Syria 543 
Uganda 40.84   India 1001   Indonesia 62.55   
Congo, 
D.R. 531 
Bolivia 40.60   Iran 984   India 62.52   Sri Lanka 530 
Ethiopia 40.19   Pakistan 798   Uganda 59.12   Haiti 499 
Vietnam 39.00   Congo, D.R. 698   China 59.09   Eritrea 489 
Cameroon  38.67   Haiti 647   Egypt 58.78   India 466 
Zambia  37.29   Algeria 528   Colombia 55.70   Colombia 423 
Nicaragua 36.94   Vietnam 462   Bangladesh  54.19   Armenia 354 
Senegal 35.40   Nigeria 450   Vietnam 54.01   Algeria 350 
Philippines  34.58   Armenia 431   Haiti 51.15   Bangladesh  306 
Morocco 34.07   Albania 327   Serbia 50.06   Georgia 303 
Notes: number of asylum seekers: yearly average in destination country. Bilateral aid: yearly average in recipient country, in 
constant million US$. 
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Table A3  - Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max       
Bilateral aid (mil constant  US$) 27,875 29.1 133.4 0 13021.8 
Aid from all others (mil. constant US$) 31,976 667.8 1,038.4 2.4 25,330.1 
Humanitarian aid (mil. constant  US$) 11,830 6.6 30.8 0 823.6 
Asylum seekers 27,184 230 1,120.5 0 75,138 
Refugees 21,148 1,333.4 7,583.1 1 350,000 
Immigrant inflows 27,651 1,402.6 5,431.3 0 165,000 
Distance 33,222 7,099 3,468 491.8 18,008.3 
pc_GDP origin (constant 2005 US$) 31,990 2,656 5,019.8 68.6 46856.8 
Population origin (mil.) 33,194 44.00 159.4 0.1 1357.4 
Refugees other  destinations 32,858 89,473 312,136 0 3809767 
Natural disasters (total deaths) 25,060 817.34 8,133.5 0 229566 
Proportion rejected 22,148 58.22 3.34 53.1 63.98 
Asylum Policy Index 26,894 7.15 2.85 1 16 
Political terror 32,536 2.97 0.95 1 5 
Civil liberties 32,816 4.38 1.53 1 7 
pc_GDP destination (constant 2005 US$) 33,222 37,551 9,251 19,448 69,094.8 
Population destination (mil.) 33,222 50.02 70.98 4.3 316.5 
Unemployment r. destination 33,222 7.58 3.50 2.5 26.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
Table A4 - Correlation matrix 
  
Bilateral 
asylum  
Bilateral 
refugees 
Bilateral 
immigrants 
Bilateral 
aid 
Bilateral 
humanitarian 
aid 
pcGDP 
dest. 
Population 
dest. 
pcGDP 
orig. 
Population 
orig. 
Distance 
Bilateral asylum  1                   
Bilateral refugees 0.2475* 1                 
Bilateral immigrants 0.3173* 0.2900* 1               
Bilateral aid 0.0709* 0.0798* 0.1150* 1             
Bilateral humanitarian a. 0.1068* 0.1161* 0.0802* 0.3926* 1           
pcGDP dest. -0.0339* -0.0082 -0.0483* 0.0261* 0.0639* 1         
Population dest. 0.0957* 0.1176* 0.2692* 0.1992* 0.2376* -0.0475* 1       
pcGDP orig. -0.0287* -0.0123 -0.014 -0.0540* -0.0594* 0.0252* 0.0021 1     
Population orig. 0.1049* 0.0257* 0.3001* 0.0552* -0.0123 0.0085 0.0007 -0.0525* 1   
Distance -0.1029* -0.0229 -0.0167 0.0399* 0.1035* -0.0339* 0.2000* -0.0289* 0.0683* 1 
Notes: * Significant at the 1 percent level. 
